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NOTES
THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT: NLRB V. GETMAN
In NLRB v. Getman,' the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit narrowed the scope of information which administrative agencies may withhold under the Freedom of Information Act.'
Compelling the National Labor Relations Board to disclose 35 Excelsior
lists,' the court found that nondisclosure was not warranted by any
of the Act's exemptions. Moreover, courts were found powerless to
withhold information not within one of the Act's specific exemptions.'
Plaintiffs, both labor law professors and former NLRB attorneys,
had sought the lists in order to conduct a study funded by the National
Science Foundation. The study was designed to test empirically the
behavioral assumptions underlying Board rules governing union representation elections. The Board had sought to withhold the lists under
exemptions (4), (7) and (6) of the Act. The court dealt with the
applicability of each of these exemptions before turning to the issue of
judicial discretion."

(4):

EXEMPTION
INFORMATION

TRADE SECRETS AND COMMERCIAL OR FINANCIAL
OBTAINED FROM A PERSON AND PRIVILEGED OR
CONFIDENTIAL

Initially, the Board argued that exemption (4) allowed the withholding of any information given the government in confidence. The
1. 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
2. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Act]. The Act provides
that, subject to nine categorical exemptions, identifiable records of government
agencies shall be made available to any person upon request. The Act is part of
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301,
5335, 5362, 7521 (1970).
3. Within seven days after a union representation election is directed, an
employer must furnish the NLRB Regional Director with the names and addresses
of all employees eligible to vote in the election. The Board transmits this list to
the union to give it an opportunity to contact the employees. Excelsior Underwear,
Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). The Supreme Court accepted the principle of
Excelsior in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordan Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
4. The district court had found the lists were not within the Act's exemptions
and that, assuming courts had equitable discretion to deny disclosure of information
not specifically exempted, the Board had not satisfied its burden of justifying nondisclosure. The Act places the burden of justifying nondisclosure on the agency from
which information is sought. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1970).
5. This note is limited to a discussion of the particular issues raised by the decision
in Getman. The most comprehensive treatment of the Act and the early decisions
under it can be found in Note, The 1966 Freedom of Information Act: Early Judicial
Interpretations,44 WAsH. L. Rxv. 641 (1969) [hereinafter cited as r966 Act].
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court, however, regarded such a construction as contrary to the "plain
meaning" 8 of the exemption, thereby adopting the view of Consumers
Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans AdministrationW that exemption (4) applied only to: "(1) trade secrets and (2) information which
is (a) commercial or financial, (b) obtained from a person, and (c)
privileged or confidential." 8 Therefore, according to the Getman court,
exemption (4) afforded no justification for the Board's withholding of
the noncommercial, nonfinancial Excelsiorlists.
Following its quotation from Consumers Union, the court characterized an Excelsior list as:
A bare list of names and addresses of employees which employers are required to give the Board, without any express
promise of confidentiality, and which cannot be fairly characterized as "trade secrets" or "financial" or "commercial"
information.'
When this characterization of Excelsior lists is compared with the
earlier breakdown of exemption (4), the relevance of the emphasized
phrase is unclear. As "confidential" is apparently the only requisite
element of exemption (4) whose legal meaning is not relatively certain,"0
any significance the court's observations may have must relate to that
term. Read with the other D.C. Circuit cases which have dealt with the
meaning of "confidential," Getman indicates that an unintentional definition of that term may be emerging. The result could be confusing
in that the "express promise" and "compulsion of law" requirements of
the definition are, despite the Getman dicta, inapplicable to exemption
(4).
In Ackerley v. Ley," the D.C. court stated in dictum that receipt
of medical records under an express promise of confidentiality would
not in itself justify nondisclosure under exemption (6), despite the fact
that such records are explicitly mentioned in (6) as the type which the
exemption was designed to protect from disclosure." It thus seems
unlikely that exemption (4), which does not expressly mention any
kind of record as protected and involves less delicate interests than medical
6. 450 F.2d at 673.
7. 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
8. Id. at 802.
9 450 F.2d at 673 (emphasis added).
10. Note, Freedom of Information: The Statute and the Regulations, 56 GEO.
L.J. 18, 35-37 &n.126 (1967).
11. 420 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
12. Id. at 1339-40 n.3.
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privacy, could serve to prevent disclosure on the basis of an express
promise of confidentiality."5 The observation of the Getman court must,
therefore, imply that although an express promise alone will not defeat
disclosure, it is nonetheless somehow relevant to a court's inquiry into
whether the information is confidential. In Grumman Aircraft Engineering Co. v. Renegotiation Board,"4 the D.C. court described the inquiry
as a process of determining whether documents "contain financial or
commercial information which the informant would not reveal to the
public and therefore are exempt from disclosure."'" To meet this test,
an informant's extraction of an express promise of confidentiality could
be used in the process as evidence that an informant would not reveal
the information to the public.
The court's observation that the lists were given under compulsion
of law also adds an unwarranted judicial gloss to the meaning of
"confidential." In Bristol-Myers Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,6
the D.C. court stated that exemption (4) functioned to protect the
privacy of one who "offers information to assist government policymakers."'" Getman's observation that the Excelsior lists were required
to be given to the Board may be read with Bristol-Myers as indicating
13. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis believes Ackerley's comment "has applications
far beyond the sixth exemption." K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3A.22
(1970 Supp.) [hereinafter cited as DAvis TREATISE]. While Davis did not specify
these applications, he. would probably agree with the one made here. However,
exemption (6)'s unique balancing requirement [see note 37 infra & text accompanying]
may so distinguish it from other exemptions that such analogies cannot be drawn
with certainty. While an express promise may be accorded varying weights when
the interest of personal privacy is being balanced, the intellectual process involved
in according weights in a balancing situation is not necessarily the same as that involved
in determining whether a document fits a definition of "confidential."
14. 425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
15. Id. at 582. Such an approach was criticized before Grumman as holding
the government to standards established by private parties even though the information
might affect the public interest. Comment, Freedom of Information--Court May
Permit Withholding of Information not Exempted from Disclosure under the Freedom
of Information Act, 5 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS--CIv. LiB. L. REv. 121, 124 (1970).
A more telling criticism is that the Grumman test may be used to justify withholding information in just such a case as the House Report accompanying the Act
says it was designed to prevent: In 1962, the National Science Foundation refused
to disclose cost estimates submitted by unsuccessful bidders for an NSF 6ontract
Withholding was based upon the NSF's view of "the public interest." The successful
contractor had not submitted the lowest bid. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
5 (1966) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.]. Under the Gruinhian method of determining whether information should be exempted under (4), the successful contractor's
quite reasonable unwillingness to disclose his bid would have justified the NSF in refusing
to disclose. If the Grumman test not only fails to correct the abuses the Act was
designed to correct, but actually serves as a basis for their continuance, the test cannot
be correct.
16. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
17. Id. at 938.
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that information not voluntarily given cannot be exempt from disclosure
as confidential under (4). However, nothing in the exemption's plain
language, upon which the court so assiduously relied, requires such a
restriction."
EXEMPTION (7): INVESTIGATORY FILES COMPILED FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT AVAILABLE
TO A PARTY OTHER THAN AN AGENCY

In holding exemption (7)

inapplicable, the court again adopted a

"plain language" view of the statute's meaning. The court rejected both
the Attorney General's Memorandum interpreting the Act 9 and the
House report" upon which the Memorandum was based. Instead, the
court interpreted exemption (7) in accord with the Senate report"'
which equated "law enforcement purposes" with the prosecution of law
violators. The court required that disclosure be capable of harming the
Government's case "in court"22 before the exemption could apply.22
18. When the D.C. court does attempt to clarify the meaning of "confidential,"
it may seek to derive a standard from the exemption's purpose. Unfortunately, past
opinions have read into exemption (4) a purpose to protect privacy without assessing
the implications of this approach. Thus, Bristol-Myers viewed the function of exemption
(4) in terms of privacy, and Grumman described the exemption's purpose as avoidance
of "unwarranted invasions of personal privacy." 425 F.2d at 580. However, another
exemption in the Act, exemption (6), expressly provides for withholding information if
disclosure would result in a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Finding
a similar purpose in exemption (4) is at best redundant. At worst, it injects an interestbalancing process into the exemption through use of the term "unwarranted." Such
a process is not justified by the plain language of the exemption. Moreover, the court
in Getmcan described balancing as inappropriate under any exemption other than
(6). Ambiguities in the term "confidential" will, therefore, not be cured by resorting to
case descriptions of exemption (4)'s purpose. The next step must be toward a definition of "confidential" which effectively separates exemptions (4) and (6). As long
as anomalies in judicial interpretations remain, agencies may be expected to take
advantage of them in order to avoid disclosure.
19. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAm's MEMORANDum ON THE PUBUC
INFORATMION SECTION OF THE ADmINIsTRATivE PROCEDURE ACT (1967) [hereinafter
cited as ATTORNEY GENERA'S MEmoRA rum].
20. H.R. REP., supra note 15.
21. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.].
The Court regarded the Senate report as a more reliable indicator of legislative
intent than the House report because the latter was not published until after the Senate
had passed its bill. The Senate report, on the other hand, had been considered by both
houses. 450 F.2d at 673 n.8. In addition, the bill originated in and was drafted in the
Senate. Brief for Consumers Union of United States, Inc., as Amicus Curiae at 12.
22. The phrase "in court" should not be construed as exclusive. Bristol-Myers
indicated the exemption may apply to investigatory files compiled for adjudicatory
proceedings which are not, strictly speaking, "in court" 424 F.2d at 939. Bristol-Myers
was cited in support of the Getman holding.
23. 450 F.2d at 673. Compare the court's narrow reading of the exemption
with those in Evans v. Transportation Dep't, 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), and
Cowles Communications, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726 (N.D.
Cal. 1971).
Both held that exemption (7) applied to investigatory files although
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Excelsior lists lack both characteristics and, thus, could not be exempt
from disclosure under (7). Prior to Getman, however, agency regulations
drew heavily upon the Attorney General's Memorandum. Therefore, it
is important to delineate that part of the House report which goes beyond
the scope of the document the D.C. court regards as controlling.
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, who was cited by the court to
support its reliance on the Senate report, believes the Senate's term
"law violators"" is compatible with the House's view that the exemption
covers investigatory files related not only to the enforcement of criminal
laws but also to all other types of laws. However, Professor Davis
believes the House report enlarges the terms of the statute by allowing
inclusion of noninvestigative files within the exemption merely because
they are "commingled" 5 with a larger investigative file.2" Under Getman,
therefore, agencies may not suppress noninvestigative files by the commingling technique tacitly allowed by the House report and the Attorney
General's Memorandum." However, whether particular information bears
such a direct relationship to impending proceedings that the Government's case would be harmed in court by premature discovery must still
be determined on a case-by-case basis.2"
EXEMPTION (6): PERSONNEL AND MEDICAL FILES AND SIMILAR
FILES, THE DISCLOSURE OF WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE A CLEARLY
UNWARRANTED INVASION OF PERSONAL PRIVACY

The Getman court held that, even assuming Excelsior lists are
among the types of information which exemption (6) was designed to
protect from forced disclosure, the Board had not sufficiently justified
nondisclosure under the exemption. The court regarded exemption (6)
as requiring
a court reviewing the matter de novo to balance the right of
there was no possibility of the files' being used in court. Neither case was mentioned
by the court in Getman.

24. S. REP., sipra note 21, at 9.
25. The term "commingle" was first used in this sense in Nader, Freedom from
Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. LIB. L. Rxv. 1, 9
(1970)

[hereinafter cited as Nader].

26. DAvis TREATISE, supra note 13, at § 3A.23; Davis, The Information Act: A
Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. Rav. 761, 799-800 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Davis].
27. Some agencies have been accused of exploiting the exemption by deliberately
opening investigative files in order to insert, and thus exempt, a requested record.
Nader, supranote 25, at 7, 10.
28. Since determinative rules governing all situations are difficult to construct,
avoidance practices under the exemption may continue to be checked only by threat of
suit. If a recalcitrant agency doubts that the threat will be carried out, investigative files
could continue as catchalls of information which the agency is determined to conceal
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privacy of affected individuals against the right of the public
to be informed; and the statutory language "clearly unwarranted" instructs the court to tilt the balance in favor of disclosure.2 9
Getman's balancing was a multistep process. The court first inquired
whether disclosure to the plaintiffs would invade the privacy of the
individuals whose names and addresses were disclosed. The court found
that it would. Secondly, the court evaluated the seriousness of the invasion
and found it to be "relatively minor," since an employee contacted for an
interview during plaintiffs' study could refuse to disclose any information
more personal than a name and address."0
Against this invasion of individual privacy the court balanced the
study's public interest purpose. Labor law scholars have long called for
empirical inquiry into the relevance of the elaborate regulations which
govern the conduct of parties to a union representation election.3 ' If
29. 450 F.2d at 674.
30. The court noted that the employee is first contacted by telephone and asked
if he is willing to be interviewed. Id. at 675 & n.12. He is forewarned by a letter
describing the study and giving assurances of confidentiality and of the independence
of the study from the parties to the election. Brief for Appellees at 8. The court did
not, however, note that the initial contact is in person if the employee does not have
a phone. Id. at 8 n.19.
The court found that the exemption was directed toward the protection of
"intimate" and "highly personal" records, such as those kept by the Veterans
Administration, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Selective
Service System or the Bureau of Prisons. A bare name and address, on the other
hand, can betray nothing embarrassing. 450 F.2d. at 675, citing H.R. REP., supra
note 15, at 11; S. REP., supra note 21, at 9. However, a list of names and addresses is
seldom "bare." Lists are usually compiled for reasons. The reasons may be personal or
embarrassing to the persons listed. The Department of Defense, for example, has a list
of names of contractors from whom the Department will not accept bids. Many of those
on the list have been convicted of fraud in connection with defense contracting. Disclosure
of such a list might be highly embarrassing, although the list contains nothing more
than names and addresses. See x966 Act, supra note 5, at 675 n.170.
31. The court cited Bernstein, The N.L.R.B.'s Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma
U zder the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 582 (1970); Bok, The
Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 78 HARv.L. REv. 38, 46-53, 88-90 (1964); Samoff, N.L.R.B. Elections:
Certainty and Uncertainty, 117 U. P.& L. REv. 228, 253 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Samoff]; and Note, Behavioral and Non-Behavioral Approaches to NLRB Representation Cases, 45 Ixw. L.J. 276 (1970).
Samoff says one of the Board's behavioral assumptions is that employees are
generally "unthinking, unfeeling, passive and reactive-easily swayed, unable to
evaluate, and susceptible to propaganda, promises and blandishments." Samoff, supra
at 235, quoted in Note, supra at 277 n.3. Bernstein suspects most Board doctrine is
based upon "untested suppositions," and that, if they are unfounded, "the whole
Board election process is askew." Berstein, supra at 582, quoted in Brief for Appellees
at 5. The Board admits it does not evaluate the actual effect on employees of specific
party conduct. Rather, the Board determines "whether it is reasonable to conclude that
the conduct tended to prevent the free formation and expression of the employee's
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the Board's regulations are founded upon invalid behavioral assumptions,
the tremendous costs of Board regulation could be reduced. 2
The Board argued, however, that the interviews could influence
employee votes, result in challenges to election results and thereby necessitate Board hearings to determine the validity of election results. The
resultant delay in resolving representation issues was alleged to be
contrary to the public interest. In effect, the Board asserted that the
study's potential interference with the "laboratory conditions" of elections
detracted from the weight to be accorded the public interest in the
study's successful completion. The Board alleged, therefore, that the
public interest in the study did not justify an invasion of personal
privacy."
The Board's objection to the possibility of additional hearings and
delays was dismissed as speculative and a "shortsighted view" of what
was ultimately in the Board's self-interest. 4 The court noted that the
purpose of the study was to determine the necessity of the very regulations
which give rise to the hearings and delays the Board feared. The court
further examined the quality of the study and the directors' qualifications,
found both to be excellent, and determined that the study was thus
likely to achieve its public interest purpose. 5 In effect, the court required
choice." 450 F.2d at 676 n.16, quoting 33 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 60 (1969). Cf. The
Liberal Market, Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1481 (1954), where the Board said, "We seek
to establish ideal conditions insofar as possible, but we appraise the actual facts in
the light of realistic standards of human conduct." Id. at 1482, quoted in Note, stepra
at 276 n.2.
32. The results of approximately one in seven representation elections are challenged for violation of NLRB rules. 450 F.2d at 675.
33. The Board argued that the persons interviewed might defer to the view
they believe the interviewer would prefer. Brief for Appellants at 7-9 & n.6. The
authorities cited by the Board, however, were addressed to the problem of the validity
and accuracy of responses rather than to the influence of interviews on subsequent
behavior patterns. The Board could more directly have argued that the interviews
would produce an inaccurate picture of behavioral patterns and that the inaccuracies
would defeat the validity of the study's conclusions, and, hence, vitiate the public
interest in its successful completion. However, it is doubtful such an approach would
have been successful. The court found that interviewers were trained to avoid influencing employees and that no evidence to justify the Board's fears had manifested itself
in the three pilot studies conducted by the plaintiffs. 450 F.2d at 675-76.
34. Id. at 675.
35. Plaintiffs were described as "highly qualified specialists in labor law." Both
taught labor law, were former attorneys for the Board and had authored law review
articles in the field. The court examined the quality of the study by noting the approval
of the "prestigious National Science Foundation." the size of the grant (the largest
ever given for a law-related study), the support of "virtually every major scholar
in the labor law field" and the fact that the study was designed in collaboration with
survey research experts. Id. at 676-77.
The court further noted that the study would involve only 35 out of 15,006
elections to be conducted by the Board over its two-year course. However, the
court did not indicate whether it attached significance to the small number of Board-
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a reasonable likelihood that the study would be successfully completed.
Balancing the public interest in the successful completion of the study
against the minimal invasion of employee privacy and the speculative
delays in election resolution, the court held that exemption (6) did not
86
apply.
The court's balancing approach under exemption (6) is a sound one.
Despite the broad disclosure mandate of the Act, the phrase "clearly
unwarranted" necessitates a weighing of interests to distinguish those
invasions of privacy which are warranted by the public interest from
those which would be offensive. As the court said:
Although one of the purposes of the . .

.

Act was to limit

agency discretion not to disclose by abandoning the former
ground rule that a person requesting information show he was
"properly and directly concerned,"

.

.

.

we find that this

purpose is in unavoidable conflict with the explicit balancing
requirement of Exemption (6)

.

Nevertheless, Professor Davis asserts that balancing is precluded
by the Act. He regards the requirement to disclose to "any person" as
preventing distinctions among the interests of persons seeking disclosure.
Instead, Davis believes that the rights of all information seekers are
equal. In his view, the rights of the "officious" are as great as the rights
of one with a legitimate interest in obtaining information."8
conducted elections the study might disrupt or to the small number of persons whose
privacy would be invaded. The court observed that the only other means of obtaiing

the lists entailed a risk of prejudicing the study',s results. For their pilot studies,
plaintiffs had obtained employee lists from the unions which were parties to the elections.
Such a procedure entailed the risk that the employees would believe the interviews were
union-sponsored and hence give slanted replies. Brief for Appellees at 11-12. The
slanted replies would mar the validity of the study.
Cf. Ackerley v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969):
[T]he fact that appellant might, presumably by a combination of intuition
and diligent research, ferret out some of the materials relied upon is surely
no reason to suppose that Congress made revelation under the Freedom of
Information Act contingent upon a showing of exhaustion of one's own

ingenuity.
ed., at 1342.
36. The court added the following caveat:
[A] court's discretion to grant disclosure under Exemption (6) carries
with it an implicit limitation that the information, once disclosed, be used only
by the requesting party and for the public interest purpose upon which the balancing was based.
450 F.2d at 67 n.24.
37. Id.
38. DAvis TREATiSE. supra note 13, at § 3A.4; Davis, supra note 26, at 765-66.
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971), adopted this interpretation of "any

person."
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The contrasting views of Davis and the court can, however, be
reconciled. Moreover, the same reasoning which reconciles their interpretations can also explain the court's weighing the public interest-as
opposed to the plaintiffs' private interests-in having the information
disclosed. The court correctly believes the term "unwarranted" in exemption (6) necessarily requires a balancing to determine whether private information should be disclosed. If, however, as Davis notes, Congress
foreclosed weighing individual interests by the phrase "any person,"
then it must have intended that the explicit balancing requirement of the
term "unwarranted" be satisfied by weighing some other interest,
namely, the public interest. Thus, it was unnecessary for the court to
adopt the suspect position that a specific provision of the Act overrides
a known legislative purpose.
The Burden of Proof
Subsection (a)(3) of the Act provides that in any de novo proceeding under the Act, the agency has the burden of sustaining its
decision to withhold. 9 The effect of balancing under exemption (6),
however, is to shift the burden of proof to the person seeking disclosure.
The agency need only demonstrate that revealing the requested information would entail an invasion of privacy. The person seeking the
information must then demonstrate a publio interest in disclosure
sufficient to overcome the privacy interests. In Getman, two interests
weighed in favor of nondisclosure: privacy and possible interference
with the Board's statutory function of expediting elections. The latter
interest was dismissed by the court summarily." More likely to have
weighed heavily against disclosure was a judgment that the right of
privacy is of a higher value, in the abstract, than the right to information.
Privacy is an interest protected by the Constitution from governmental
intrusions 4 and by tort law from invasions by individuals."' The right
to information is served only by the Freedom of Information Act. Any
balancing of the right of privacy and the right to information under
exemption (6) will be within the framework of these relative values.
Although the invasion of privacy was relatively minor, the court's
sensitivity to privacy rights required a strong public interest in the
study to justify the invasion. Thus, an invasion of privacy will be
39. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1970).
40. See note 34 supra & text accompanying.
41. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967).

42. W.

PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW

OF TORTS § 112 (3d ed. 1964).
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relatively easy to demonstrate while an overriding public interest in
that invasion will not.
Agency Decisions to Disclose
While the Act provides for a de novo judicial proceeding when an
agency withholds information, there is no provision for evaluation of
an agency's decision to disclose. At some point, the agency itself will
balance the competing interests under exemption (6). While the Getman
court apparently approves such an exercise of agency discretion, problems
may arise which the court apparently did not consider. In theory, the
function of government is to serve the public interest, but because
particular government agencies operate only within narrow areas of this
public interest it is not surprising that they may occasionally view the
public interest in terms of their own narrow activities. The absence of
specialization in the judiciary aids courts in formulating broader conceptions of the public good. In Getman, the Board's parochial shortsightedness 8 led it to object that plaintiffs' study might violate the very
Board rules whose premises the study sought to test. The Board's
objection took the form of withholding information requested under
thq Act.
However, there is also the risk that an agency's narrow view may
lead it to disclose information which a court would not disclose. This
risk is compounded by the ineffectiveness of the remedies available to
the person injured by such administrative disclosure. Although the
person whose privacy is threatened could seek an injunction against the
agency prior to disclosure, thus providing a judicial opportunity to
balance the competing interests, it is doubtful whether the individual
affected will know of the potential invasion until it takes place." The
fierson affected could sue the agency for abuse of discretion once the
decision to disclose was discovered, but such a suit would not eliminate
the ill effects of the disclosure.
The Getman opinion left other potential problems unresolved. The
court stated that a judicial grant of disclosure implies that the information may be used only by the person to whom disclosed and only for
43. See note 34 supra & text accompanying.
44. The person affected could request notification of pending disclosure so he could
seek an injunction against disclosure. The Act, however, only gives jurisdiction to
issue injunctions against withholding, not against disclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3)

(1970). Resolution of the disclosure question outside the Act would not seem to

accord with the congressional intent that the Act govern disclosure policies. Nor

would extraction of an express promise not to disclose be sufficient protection. See
notes 11-13 supra &text accompanying.
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the purpose weighed in the balancing process.4" Noncoerced administrative disclosures would seem to carry with them the same limitations
as a judicial grant of disclosure, but it is not clear how such administrative limitations would be enforced. A court could use its contempt
power or find a tort remedy for the person whose privacy was violated
in disregard of the conditions of judicial disclosure. An agency, however,
'acks contempt power, and a court cannot cite for contempt of an
agency order. Furthermore, while a tort remedy might be available
for such clearly unwarranted invasions of personal privacy, the preferable approach is to avoid commission of the tort in the first instance.
Any genuine agency doubt as to the applicability of exemption (6),
therefore, should be resolved by nondisclosure so that the ultimate
responsibility for determining whether the public interest warrants an
invasion of personal privacy will remain with the courts. Although this
approach may be cumbersome, expensive and time-consuming, it is
nonetheless preferable to disclosure of personal information without
controls.
Balancing and Agency Expertise
When a disclosure question does reach a court, it must be recognized
that an agency's narrow view of the public interest may still control
the outcome. Courts often defer to the expertise of executive agencies,
particularly such regulatory agencies as the NLRB.46 Getman was not
a fundamental departure from this practice. While the court summarily
rejected the Board's argument that the possible interference with "laboratory conditions" overcame the public interest in the study's successful
completion, that fact alone is deceptive. It must be noted that the plaintiffs
were former NLRB attorneys, recognized labor law authorities, and were
engaged in a project designed in collaboration with experts in survey
research. The court stated that requests
by less well qualified applicants or applicants with a less carefully
designed or more disruptive study would, require a new
45. See note 36 supra.

46. See, e.g., SEC v. New England Elec. Sys., 384 U.S. 176, 185 (1966).
Cf. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965):
There is of course no question that the Board is entitled to the greatest
deference in recognition of its special competence in dealing with labor
problems.
Id. at 316. But the Court went on to state:
The deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into
a judicial inertia which results in an unauthorized assumption by an agency
of major policy decisions properly made by Congress.
Id. at 318.

NLRB V. GETMAN
balancing and might be found to involve a "clearly unwarranted
invasion of privacy" which would justify nondisclosure."
In analyzing the interests involved, the court, rather than evaluating
the study's elaborate structure, relied upon labor law experts who
approved the study's purpose and upon survey research experts who
approved the study's design. The case may fairly be characterized as
one of experts versus experts, with the court persuaded by the weight
of authority as much as by the merits. If the person seeking disclosure is
unable to marshal such an impressive array of specialized authority to
support his definition of the public interest, the court must strive for a
truly de novo proceeding and guard against the tendency to ratify bureaucratic definitions.
While the court must engage in a balancing process, it should recognize that the quality of a study's design and the qualifications of
its directors are largely functions of the amount of money supporting the
project."8 According weight to applicants' specialized qualifications and
to the quality of their study's design will probably result in organizations such as "Nader's Raiders" experiencing difficulty in dislodging
information which could come within exemption (6). Such organizations
are staffed largely by amateurs, including college students working
during the summer months. Their projects will not approach the
sophistication of the model in Getman, although their purposes may be
no less ambitious and public-spirited. Because projects such as that in
Getman are rare, denying information to less sophisticated groups will
result in a severe limitation on the number and scope of public interest
investigations which require personal information." A court should
weigh the desirability of this result among the factors it balances in
determining whether to require disclosure.
Courts must also recognize that administrative agencies may seek
to avoid the impact of the Getman decision by using exemption (6) to
withhold noncommercial and nonfinancial information which exemp47. 450 F.2d at 677 n.24.
48. The plaintiff's project has been funded by a 204,300 dollar grant from
the National Science Foundation, the largest ever given for a law-related study.
Part of the grant maintains the plaintiffs as directors, while the remainder pays for
the well-trained interviewers and the specialists who trained them, the data reduction
workers and facilities and so forth. A project which lacks funds to maintain such
highly qualified specialists will almost certainly have less well-qualified personnel.

49. The Civil Aeronautics Board has denied to associates of Mr. Nader the
names of complainants before that agency on the ground that airlines might take
retaliatory action against the complainants. The denial made it impossible to contact the
complainants in order to assess the effectiveness of the CAB's response to complaints.
Nader, supranote 25, at 11-12.
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tion (4) will no longer serve to protect. The success of such an attempt
will hinge on the meaning of "personal," for exemption (6) permits
withholding only when "personal privacy" is threatened by disclosure."
As a policy matter, however, the courts should avoid importing the
confusing goals of exemption (4) into exemption (6). Here, as in
other sections of the Act, a primary value is certainty of result, for
without certainty the Act cannot fulfill its promise."
EQUITABLE DIsCRETION

Having determined that the Excelsior lists did not fall within any
of the exemptions, the court further held that "a District Court has
no equitable jurisdiction to deny disclosure on grounds other than those
laid out under one of the Act's enumerated exemptions."52 This holding
was not unheralded. In Bristol-Meyers, the D.C. court had described
the structure of the Act as "a liberal disclosure requirement, limited
only by specific exemptions which are to be narrowly construed.""3
In Soucie v. David, 4 the same court stated in dictum that the Act
reflected a congressional balancing and resolution of interests which
would be upset by judicial exercise of equitable discretion.
Having previously stated that balancing under any exemption other
than (6) is inappropriate, the holding that courts lack equitable powers
foreclosed future general consideration of agency arguments that disclosure would overburden or disrupt their activities.55 Such a sweeping
restriction was necessary in order to influence agency disclosure policies.
Had the court used language limited to the Getman case, agencies not
immediately affected by the opinion might have felt free to continue
their present withholding policies. Prior to Getman, the agencies'
50. The Attorney General's memorandum states that although the exemption
normally involves individual privacy, corporations and other organizations are also
within its protection because of the Administrative Procedure Act's definition of
"person." ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 19, at 36-37. Davis believes
that "personal prii'acy" always relates to individuals and that the Administrative Procedure Act's definition of "person" has no relevance because that word is not used in
exemption (6). DAvis TREATISE, supra note 13, at § 3A.22; Davis, supra note 26, at 799.
The phrase "clearly unwarranted" probably indicates a congressional intent that
traditional notions of privacy not be stretched to defeat disclosure.
51. See notes 56-57 infra & text accompanying.
52. 450 F.2d at 678.
53. 424 F.2d at 938.
54. 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
55. The premise of such agency arguments is that government activities are,
by definition, always in the public interest. It was the validity of this premise which
the study in Getman was designed to test. See also Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21,
(4th Cir. 1971). Disruption of agency activities will still be relevant to the courts
definition of the public interest under exemption (6).
56. The NLRB's attempt to characterize Excelsior lists as investigatory files
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policies of withholding information on specious grounds had prevailed
due to the hazards of an expensive and time-consuming suit for relief.
Many individuals were simply unwilling to run these risks, no matter
how transparently invalid the agency's basis for withholding."
While Getinai refused to recognize discretion, other courts have
done so under the guise of balancing competing interests under specific
exemptions. 8 Despite contending that they were merely "balancing,"
these courts actually considered factors relevant to an equitable discretion inquiry. Nothing in the language of the exemptions (other than
exemption (6)) can reasonably be interpreted as requiring balancing, and
subsection (c) limits nondisclosure to conditions provided for in the
Act. Therefore, such balancing is merely the exercise of equitable discretion under another name.
Although the factors considered in these pre-Getman cases are
persuasive, use of the balancing process in this manner is nonetheless
inappropriate. As the Getman court noted when it characterized exemption (6)'s balancing requirement as unique, the purpose of the Act is
"to limit discretion and encourage disclosure." 9 The objection to balancfor law enforcement purposes is an example. Refusal by the CAB to disclose the
names of complainants [note 49 mipra] is another example. A recent survey of
federal agencies indicates that refusals to disclose information sought under the Act
remain common. Giannella, Agency Procedures Implenzenting the Freedom of Information Act: A Proposal for Uniform Regulations, 23 AD. L. Ray. 217, 221 (1971).
57. See cases collected in id. at 225 n.27. "[T]he absence of persistence may
reflect a lack of sophistication and money rather than a want of interest." Id. at 225.
Plaintiffs in Getman were both attorneys; they handled the litigation themselves.
58. Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967), balanced
an employer's interest in disclosure of employee witness statements against the agency's
interest in nondisclosure. General Serv. Administration v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir.
1969), weighed the "effect of disclosure and nondisclosure, according to traditional
equity principles," in determining whether exemption (5) was to apply. Id. at 880.
American Mail Line v. Gulick, 411 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1969), similarly regarded
exemption (5) as involving a balancing of competing interests. Tuchinsky v. Selective
Serv. Sys., 418 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1969), allowed the withholding of information
where disclosure would impose "an unreasonable burden" upon the agency and the
information was available elsewhere. Id. at 157. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067
(D.C. Cir. 1971), whose dicta the Getinan court quoted selectively to support its holding
that it lacked discretionary power, stated that "exceptional circumstances" could give
rise to the exercise of "limited equitable discretion" without violating the Act's
legislative intent. Id. at 1077. Cowles Communications, Inc. v. Department of Justice,
325 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Cal. 1971), allowed exempting investigatory files under
(7), although there was no possibility of their being used in court, to protect
informers' anonymity and citizens' rights of privacy. Evans v. Transportation Dep't,
446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), held that plaintiff's desire for letters in a closed investigatory life was "totally submerged by the public interest" in the agency's remaining safely accessible to informants who wished to remain anonymous. Id. at 824.
59. 450 F.2d at 674 n. 10.
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ing under specific exemptions is the same as the argument against
exercising equitable discretion: it creates uncertainty, thereby making
suits more hazardous and disappointed information seekers less likely
to sue. The less probable it is that a person seeking disclosure will call
into judicial question an agency's nondisclosure, the greater the likelihood
there is that the agency will refuse to disclose."0
Balancing under specific exemptions could create even greater unpredictability than the exercise of equitable discretion, for the former may
invite the injection of factors not generally present in the exercise of the
latter. Specifically, agency definitions of "the public interest" will be
more likely to govern the decision under listed exemptions than under
a discretionary balancing approach since the agency will be better
equipped than the plaintiff or the court to explain how a particular
exemption relates to an agency's specialized activities. The result of
such a balancing process may ultimately be judicial deference to agency
expertise, a result approaching resurrection of the old Administrative
Procedure Act's abuses. General equity decisions, however, would derive
from arguments couched in less heavily specialized terms, thereby removing many of the handicaps facing a potential plaintiff.
The exemptions of the Freedom of Information Act are not so precise that courts may be expected to apply them without a preliminary period of definition. During this period, however, the courts must not resort
to such methodological devices as balancing, which could ultimately
defeat the purpose of the Act."' The lead of Getman in renouncing
both discretion and balancing under specific exemptions, and instead
emphasizing the Act's plain language, must be followed if the Act is to
60.

The House report indicates that a purpose of providing for de novo judicial

proceedings in subsection (3) was to "serve as an influence against the initial wrongful
withholding." H.R. REP., supra note 15, at 9. If uncertainty renders suit so risky
that information seekers seldom litigate, the existence of a judicial remedy will have
little impact on agency disclosure practices.
61. Davis suggests the use of discretion to modify the poorly drawn exemptions.
Davis, supra note 26, at 803-04. It has also been suggested that equitable discretion be
employed for a limited period while the various exemptions are clarified. Note,
Disclorre Denied:
Judicial Discretion and the Freedom of Information Act:

Conmumers Union v. Veterans Administration, 45
suggestions

IND.

would result in uncertainty. The Note's

L.J. 421, 433 n.89 (1970). Both
solution, moreover,

does not

resolve the problem of when the various periods would begin and end, so that
unpredictability of suit would remain.
62. In the meantime, information seekers can take advantage of the Act's
liberal venue provisions to file suit in the District of Columbia. Suit may be brought
where the plaintiff resides, where he has his place of business or where the records are
situated. S U.S.C. § 522(a) (3) (1970). Even records used exclusively by an agency's
field offices may be duplicated at the Washington home office, thus providing a
basis for venue there.
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fulfill its promise. The preeminence of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in the field of administrative law will
hopefully influence other circuits to follow its lead.62
PROCTOR D. H. ROBISON

